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Through the use of the question and answer format in this
article, I hope to cover the main areas where product liability is
expanding, both as to the imposition of liability and the admissibility of proof. This format is suggested by the type of questions
which have been put to me when I have lectured on the subject.
I practice as plaintiffs counsel, and my answers are inevitably
shaped in that light. Indeed, it is the plaintiff, through product
litigation, that is causing the expansion in this area of the law.
The thirty topics which are covered are divided into the following parts: strict liability, negligence, other forms of liability
and parties, and proof. A good deal of space is devoted to the
proof topics, since much of the expansion of the law in recent
years has been little more than an expansion of the type of proof
which courts will accept. In turn, that expansion of proof has
given juries more leeway in determining the outcome, guided by
only the broadest definitions of liability.
A.
1.

STRICT LIABILITY

What are the elements of a strict liability action?

The most commonly adopted source for the law of strict liability, the formulation of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A, sets out three requirements:
a-the product is in a defective condition;
b-the product is unreasonably dangerous;
c-the defect existed at the time it left the defendant's hands.'
The most crucial requirement is that there be a defect, a concept
covered in question 2 below.
As to the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement, technically, just because a product is dangerous does not fit it within
the requirements of § 402A, since objects such as guns and dynamite are dangerous but can be said, based upon ordinary consumer understanding, to be "reasonably" so. At the other end of
the spectrum, it can be said that some products, even if they have
produced personal injury, are not "dangerous," such as grapefruit
or pencils. Creation of such categories at the extreme ends of the
1. See Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50

MINN.

L. REv. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability in Tort, 32 TENN. L. Rxv. 363 (1965); generally on strict liability, see Wade, Strict
Tort Liability of Manufacturers,19 S.W. L.J. 5 (1965); Keeton, Manufacturer'sLiability:
The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufactureand Designof Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV.
559 (1969).
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product spectrum, however, is not often considered by the courts.
Generally, a product which has in fact caused injury is deemed
to meet this requirement of § 402A. Therefore, several courts
have rejected as unnecessary and unwise the requirement of "unreasonably dangerous" and call only for proof of a "defect." ' The
former is found to be only a hurdle in the consumer's path to
recovery. In the leading case abandoning the requirement, a
metal hasp holding a bread tray was recognized by the court
probably not to be "unreasonably dangerous," even when it broke
3
and caused injuries when the tray slid forward.
As to the third requirement-that the defect exist at the time
the product left the hands of whomever it is who is being
sued-its purpose, obviously, is to prevent the imposition of strict
liability upon someone at the early end of distribution where the
defect is introduced by someone beyond him in the chain, including the plaintiff. In two situations, however, the requirement
should not be used to immunize the manufacturer:
(a) where the person later in the chain, such as a retailer,
merely fails to detect and correct the originally existing defect;4
(b) where the product is perfect when made, but bears
within it the seeds of its destruction, as where it decomposes
later on or where the metal does not stand up under repeated,
foreseeable stresses.
2. What is a "defect"?
The following may be said to be within the scope of defect
as used in strict liability cases:
I. "Impure" product-not made pursuant to plan
II. "Pure" product:
(a) design flaw
(b) labeling flaw
(c) testing flaw
The architects of strict liability had the impure product situation
2. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J.Super., 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973); Annot., 54
A.L.R. 3d 352.
3. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.Rptr. 433
(1972).
4. Covered in question 12, infra.
5. Recognized in cases such as Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 42 1ll.2d
339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969); Dunn v. Ralston Purina Co., 38 Tenn.App. 229, 272 S.W.2d
479 (1954); Sharp v. Chrysler Corp., 432 S.W.2d 131 (Tex. Civ.App. 1968); see also
Rheingold, Proof of Defect in Product Liability Cases, 38 TENN. L. REv. 325, 339 (1971);
Annot., 54 A.L.R.3d 1079.
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primarily in mind-the spinach with glass, the tie rod with crystalized metal in it-any situation where the product was not
made pursuant to the plans which the manufacturer set out to
follow. Very few decided cases deal with this category of defective
products, however, mainly because they are clear liability cases.
The battleground is in category 1-the "pure" product.
A product may be defective even though it is made pursuant
to plan and even though the harm producing potential is inherent
in the way it is made.' In a broad sense, it may be stated that
anything which can give rise to a negligence cause of action may
constitute a defect in strict liability.
Examples of products, which are defective by virtue of their
"design," are a lawn mower with hard to operate controls, a machine without a safety feature, or even dynamite with too short a
fuse. 7 As to products which are defective by virtue of their labeling or their failure to bear adequate or proper warnings for safe
use, examples are a highly flammable cement which comes in a
can which does not bear a warning about the need to keep the
product away from ignition sources, or a machine without proper
8
installation directions.
The question arises whether any culpability on the part of
the supplier is necessarily to be shown in a case where the defect
is one of design or labeling. That is, is it the mere presence of a
design feature which produces injury, or the mere absence of a
warning that makes out the "defect," or must there be an impropriety involved? This is discussed below, in question 3.
There is no all-embracing definition of "defect" and there
will never be. It must be developed by the courts.' What is in back
6. See citations at note 1 supra.
7. Ilnicki v. Mongtomery Ward Co., 371 F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1967); Crane v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal.App.2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963); Wright v. Massey-Harris,
Inc., 68 IlI.App.2d 70, 215 N.E. 2d 465 (1966); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 42,
290 A.2d 281 (1972); cf., Bartkewich v. Billinger, 432 Pa. 351, 247 A.2d 603 (1968).
8. Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal.App.2d 44, 46 Cal.Rptr. 552 (1965);
General Electric Co. v. Bush, 498 P.2d 366 (Nev. 1972); Anderson v. Klix Chemical Co.,
472 P.2d 806 (Ore. 1970); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
9. The Consumer Product Safety Act, 86 Stat. 1207, 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1973), employes various descriptions and definitions of risks associated with product, the terms of
which may in time affect the concept of "defect." Under § 7, safety standards are to be
set up for products which create "an unreasonable risk of injury." "Risk of injury" is
defined in § 3(a)(3) as "risk of death, personal injury, or serious or frequent illness."
Under § 12, a seizure may be made if the product presents "imminent and unreasonable
risk of death, serious illness or severe personal injury." Under § 15, notification, repair,
refund and the like may be ordered if there is a "substantial product hazard," defined in
§ 15(a) as either creating a "substantial risk of injury" or "creates a substantial risk of
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of most decisions, however, is what may be called the "consumer
expectation" test: did the product perform as a reasonable consumer would have expected? 0
3. What are the defenses to strict liability?
I. Relating to plaintiff and others:
(a) Contributor negligence
(b) Assumption of risk
(c) Abuse of the product
(d) Intervening acts '
II. Relating to the defendant:
(a) Unavoidably unsafe
(b) State of the art
(c) Undetectable, unpreventable, unavoidable, unforeseeable defect
(d) Contract-type defenses
There is a great deal of confusion today as to whether or not
contributory negligence is a defense; the same is true of assumption of the risk and the other defenses listed in I above. Many of
the decisions can apparently be harmonized by agreeing on what
these terms mean, but there are still minority and majority views
on a number of points. The one harmonizing statement which
would command the most following among the courts is that
there is to be no defense based upon a mere failure of the user to
discover the defect, but the continued use of the product with
notice of the defect would be a defense to liability." Even the
plaintiff's misuse of a product may not be a defense if a reasonble manufacturer should have foreseen it. (See question 12
below).
Probably more cases have held that contributory negligence
is not a defense to strict liability than that it is, on the logic that
since the defendant's conduct is no longer in question neither
injury to the public ... (because of the pattern of defect, the number of defective products distributed in commerce, the severity of the risk, or otherwise). . . ." Arduous will
be the work of the judge who has to seek meaningful distinctions in these definitions
10. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); consumer expectation test utilized in Oregon cases: see Brizendine v. Visador Co., 305 F.Supp. 157 (D.Ore.
1969); and in other cases, Daleiden v. Carborundum Co., 438 F.2d 1017 (8th Cir. 1971);
Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970). One case has referred
to what a physician, the prescriber of a drug, would have expected: Carmichael v. Reitz,
17 Cal.App.3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971). See generally, Rheingold, What are the
Consumer's "ReasonableExpectations"?, 22 THE BusINEss LAWYER 589 (1967).
11. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n.
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should that of the plaintiff's be.' 2
As to those defenses based upon the lack of knowledge or
ability of the defendant to prevent the injury from the defective
condition, there is both a lack of clarity in and much conflict
among the decisions. On the one hand, the position can be taken
(as it is by those who are plaintiff-oriented) that all such defenses
are irrelevant since they are contradictory to the whole sense of
imposition of liability without fault. If the defendant can assert
as a defense that a defect was undetectable, for example, is he
not being allowed to prove care on his part, with care being
merely an aspect of fault? The defendant replies that this is the
imposition of strict, strict liability if he is to be
stripped of a
3
like.'
the
or
unforeseeability
upon
based
defense
Since this issue is crucial to the future development of product liability litigation, several fact patterns may assist in analysis:
(1) A prescription drug, purely made, produces certain side
effects inherent in its composition. The manufacturer's labeling
omits any warning about a certain side effect, at a time when the
manufacturer is unaware of it. It has used all due care to find out
what are the side effects. Some time after plaintiff develops the
side effect, but before trial, the manufacturer revises its labeling
to add a warning about the new side effect. Is the company liable
for the mere absence of the warning at the time of injury or only
if it was a culpable absence? If the test is phrased in terms of an
"inadequate" or "improper" warning, does that mean the
culpable absence or the mere absence?
(2) A pint of blood when transfused produces serum hepatitis
due to the presence of hepatitis virus in the "donor." The proof
is that the presence of the virus was undetectable.14 Should the
12. See general discussion in R. HURSH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY,
§ 5A:26 (Supp. 1973) (hereinafter HURSH). Hursh is one of the two leading multi-volume
product liability books, each of which in their own way covers the whole field of product
liability law. The other is L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUrs LIABILITY (hereinafter
FRUMER). HURSH is stronger on concrete slotting of cases into product categories, whereas
the FRUMER book is stronger on analysis.
13. An ambiguity arises when courts or writers refer to a matter being a "defense."
On some matters, the fact to be proved may be defensive in nature, meaning that it should
be heard by the jury for whatever weight it might carry. In other instances, a complete
defense is referred to: something which when pleaded and proved will preclude the plaintiff from recovery. Thus, for example, "state of the art" testimony may create a complete
defense or be merely some evidence of due care for the jury to consider.
14. Scientific advancements outdate the concept that the hepatitis virus is undetectable. It is standard procedure today to do an Australian antigen test to ascertain the
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plaintiff be freed of having to overcome the defense of undetecta-

bility?
(3) A bottle with a gross flaw in its wall is filled with a
beverage under pressure and later explodes, injuring a buyer.
Should the manufacturer or the bottler be allowed to defend on
the basis that it used due care in the inspection of the bottles it
was making or filling?
In (3), most courts would not allow a defense of due care to
be asserted, since that is transparently a negligence concept.
In (2), many courts would probably not allow a defense of
undetectability, since the product was imperfect and not made
pursuant to plan. They would, whether they have come to the
point of verbalizing it or not, make a distinction between the pure
and impure product, and allow these defenses, if at all, in the case
15
of the former only.
Drug cases, such as (1), raise special problems because of
Comment k to § 402A, which would exempt from strict liability
any drug which is "unavoidably unsafe." By that is meant the
side effect of drugs, especially those which are essential for life.
The Comment points out that "proper" labeling is required for a
product to be unavoidably unsafe. Again, is proper to be taken
in the negligence or non-negligence sense?"
presence of the virus. The drawback with the test is that it often yields false negatives. It
should also be remembered that investigation of a hepatitis-blood case may yield a basis
for a negligence claim, such as using sick or otherwise improper "donors."
15. Cases indicating that these "unavoidable" type defenses will not be accepted
include Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 S.2d 169 (Fla. 1963), cert. denied 377 U.S.
943 (1964) (undetectability of carcinogenicity of cigarettes); Green v. American Tobacco
Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (same); Filler v. Rayex Corp., 435 F.2d 336 (7th Cir.
1970) (state of the art); and the hepatitis blood cases, including Rostocki v. Southwest
Florida Blood Bank, Inc., 259 S.2d 553 (Fla. 1972), rev'd mem. 276 S.2d 475 (1973);
Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital, 47 Ill.2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970); Hoffman v. Misericordia Hospital of Phila., 439 Pa. 501, 267 A.2d 867 (1970); Reilly v. King
County Central Blood Bank, Inc., 6 Wash. App. 172, 492 P.2d 246 (1972). Contra,
McDaniel v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 469 F.2d 230 (6th Cir., 1972). See generally,
Lilienstern, Blood Contaminated by Hepatitis Virus: Reexamination of Liability, 8 THE
FORUM 543 (1972-73). According some strength to the "unavoidable" type defenses, see
Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Morrow v. Trailmobile, Inc., 12
Ariz.App. 578, 473 P.2d Cir. 1969); Morrow v. Trailmobile, Inc., 12 Ariz.App. 578, 473 P.2d
780 (1970).
16. The following cases have refused to grant Comment k immunity to prescription
drugs because of a determination that the drug was or may have been improperly labeled.
In few, if any of them, is there a discussion of what is meant by the term "proper:" Davis
v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Tinnerholm v. Parke-Davis &
Co., 411 F.2d 48 (2d Cir. 1969); Parke, Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir.
1969); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 60 Cal.Rptr. 398 (1967);
Lewis v. Baker, 243 Ore. 317, 413 P.2d 400 (1966).
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Finally, what is the vitality today of the "contract" defenses,
which have been used over the years in commercial (warranty)
cases: disclaimer, failure to give prompt notice, and the like? In
a strict liability case, these defenses have been heavily circumscribed. No sale is required. 7 No notice is required before suit can
be commenced. 18 Disclaimers may be found against public policy
and, in any case, are inapplicable to injured persons not parties
to the contract. 9 Limitations of liability dressed up in "warranty" language are also often ignored, especially in contracts of
adhesion like new car sales."0
4.

May a wrongful death action be predicated on strictliability?

Most courts have had no trouble reconciling the "wrongful"
language in death statutes with the strict liability concept.2" Similarly, courts have allowed apportionment of fault under comparative negligence statutes in strict liability actions without any
22
real problems.
5.

What sort of damage is covered by strict liability?

The following are the types of damages which might be
sought in a strict liability action, (for ease of illustration, we
imagine a car going off the road):
(a) Personal injury to the driver owner;
(b) Personal injury to a passenger;
(c) Personal injury to a "bystander" waiting on the curb for a
bus;
(d) Property damage to the picket fence;
(e) Property damage to the car itself;
(f) Loss of the bargain-lost profits the owner could have made
if he had been able to use that car the next day in his business.
17. 2 FRUriER § 16A(5).
18. 2 FRUMER § 16A(5)(d).
19. 2 FRUMER § 16A(5)(k).

20. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37
Cal.Rptr. 896, (1964); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
21. See HuRsH, § 5A:14 (Supp. 1973). Similarly, most courts have applied strict
liability to Death on the High Seas Act cases: see Lindsay v. McDonnell Douglas Aircraft
Corp., 460 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1972); Middleton v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F.Supp. 856
(S.D.N.Y. 1960); contra, Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 204 F.Supp. 929 (D.Del. 1962).
22. Hagenbuch v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 339 F.Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972). Under the
new rule of apportionment among defendants in New York, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,
30 N.Y. 2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), apparently, there would be an apportionment
of fault between defendants even in strict liability. See Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 70
Misc.2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1972).
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Every court includes (a) and (b) in strict liability. The battle
about whether the bystander, (c), is covered is all but over today
with most courts so extending strict liability. 23 As to property
damage, (d)-(f), some courts deny the applicability of strict liability, but many allow it for damage to property other than the
chattel (d). 24 There is a clear split on damage to the chattel itself
(e), and consequential damages arising therefrom (f).21 The domi-

nant rationale for refusing to extend coverage to damage to the
chattel is that this is what the Uniform Commercial Code is intended to cover.
6. In personalinjury cases, what is the role of breach of implied
warranty and of the Uniform Commercial Code?
In those states which have adopted strict liability, some have
done so to the exclusion of a cause of action for breach of implied
warranty for a personal injury, while others continue to regard
these as parallel remedies. 21 In a few states strict liability has not
yet been adopted, and the action for injury without proof of fault
on the part of the defendant is still denominated implied war27
ranty.
In most instances, it would make no difference to the outcome whether the action was called "strict liability" or "breach
of implied warranty." The "defect" of the former is the absence
of "merchantability" or "reasonable fitness" of the other. The
difference becomes crucial only on procedural matters, such as
the statute of limitations and defenses based upon notice and the
like. 28

23. See question 18 in text infra.
24. See Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.Rptr. 17, (1965);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill.2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). See generally 2 Fnumia
§ 16A(4)(f).
25. Applying strict liability to commercial losses, see Santor v. A. M. Karagheusian,
Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965) (chattel itself); Montsanto Co. v. Thrasher, 463
S.W.2d 25 (Tex.Civ.App. 1970) (commercial loss); contra, Seely v. White Motor Co., 63
Cal.2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (chattel itself); Price v. Gatlin, 241 Ore.
315, 405 P.2d 502 (1965).
26. See 2 FRUMER § 16A(3); HURSH, § 5A:3 (Supp. 1973). A fairly up-to-date chart
of the state appears in CCH PROD. LIAB. RvrR. T 4060.

27. Id.
28. As to "contract" defenses, see question 3 in text supra. As to the statute of
limitations, some courts apply the tort or personal injury period to every injury case, no
matter how pleaded (which is the more logical approach), while others apply separate
periods. That usually means that a complaint framed under warranty or under the UCC
has a 4- or 6-year period, whereas the tort period for strict liability is often 1 to 3 years.
See 3 FRUMER ch. 12.
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As to the Uniform Commercial Code, an occasional court will
still attempt to apply its sales provisions to personal injury
cases. 9 This is a pretty well discredited practice today even
though § 2-316 purports to cover injury actions. It should be
regarded as intended for commercial cases, and superseded by the
common law development of strict liability.
7.

What difference does strict liabilityreally make to the practitioner?

The advent of strict liability a decade ago was then hailed
and still tends to be hailed today as a major change in product
liability law. Without question, the "enterprise system" philosophy behind it is a major step forward in the social consciousness
of the courts. What strict liability has done in fact for the
consumer-plaintiff and his lawyer is another question. In my
view, it has accomplished little for the consumer"0 and it has had
little impact upon practice.
More plaintiffs would prefer to present their respective cases
to a jury on a negligence, rather than on a strict liability, basis.
In McLuenesque terms negligence is "hot" and strict liability is
"cold." It is easier to prevail by showing that the defendant did
something wrong than that there is something technically defective about the product. It is easier to win (and collect substantial
damages) by showing that a drug company concealed information
about side effects than to show that in fact there was no warning
on the labeling about the risks.
If strict liability makes a difference it is in the "impure"
defect case. Here it makes counsel's life much easier if he can
have the judge instruct the jury that the mere presence of glass
in a can of spinach creates liability, than if he has to prove how
the defendant carelessly put it in or failed to detect it. But those
cases had traditionally been won by plaintiffs-in the rare instance when they weren't settled.
It is sometimes argued that the plaintiff in every type of
strict liability case gains a direct benefit by having the defendant
barred from proving due care. The trouble with this argument is
that the defendant, directly or indirectly, does get this sort of
29. See, e.g., Kobeckis v. Budzko, 225 A.2d 418 (Me. 1967); Rayv. Deas, 112 Ga.App.
191, 144 S.E.2d 468 (1965); Kenney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 Mass. 604, 246 N.E.2d
649 (1969).
30. Are products now safer because manufacturers know that they are strictly liable?
After all, what can motivate them to be more careful than the requirements of negligence
law itself?
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defense before the jury. Not only are many such defenses allowed
(see question 3 above) but also § 402A does not really divorce
itself from "negligence talk." Comment k, for example, cuts off
a suit where the product was "unavoidably unsafe," unless the
3
labeling is improper. '

B.

NEGLIGENCE

8.

How complete must a warning and set of directions be?
Over the years the manufacturer has been required to use
"due care" to give "reasonable" warnings about the risks associated with the use of his product, and to give directions for use
so as to avoid injury. A recent trend among the decisions, however, tends to expand the duty of the supplier to give a full
warning, as compared to a "reasonable" one. A few examples of
the trend toward requiring complete warnings and directions may
help to show the change in emphasis:
(1) A label on a floor sander states that it should be used on
115 volts AC or DC. Plaintiff uses it on 220 DC and the machine
explodes. The court held that this case should be submitted to
the jury because there was sufficient evidence to show that the
manufacturer knew that the machine would be used in an in32
dustrial setting.
(2) A contact cement bears the warnings about the risk of
explosion and the need to extinguish all fires. Plaintiff claims
that it was an inadequate warning in that it did not state the true
degree of risk, and was not labeled "extremely inflammable."
The court agrees that this proof should have been shown to the
33
jury.
(3) A drug company undertakes to alert physicians to a newly
31. In Schneider v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 401 F.2d 549 (8th Cir. 1968), it was
observed that the standard of the safety of goods was the same under either theory.
32. Post v. American Cleaning Equipment Corp., 437 S.W.2d 516 (Ky. 1968). See
also, Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971); McCully v. Fuller Brush Co.,
68 Wash.2d 675, 415 P.2d 7 (1966) (directions inadequate without explanation of risk of
deviation).
33. Murray v. Wilson Oak Flooring Co., Inc., 475 F.2d 129 (7th Cir. 1973); De Pree
v. Nutone, Inc., 422 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1970) (complete and accurate warning due); Griffin
v. Planters Chemical Corp., 302 F.Supp. 937 (D.S.C. 1969) (where defendant indicates
product is not dangerous, warnings must be better); Tucson Industries, Inc., v. Schwartz,
108 Ariz. 464, 501 P.2d 936 (1972); Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 236 S.2d 616 (La.
App. 1970) (full and complete warning due), rev'd, 259 La. 599, 250 S.2d 754 (1971);
Libby-Owens Ford Glass Co. v. L.&M. Paper Co., 189 Neb. 792, 205 N.W.2d 523 (1973);
see also Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 398
(1970).
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discovered side effect by amending its official labeling, the package insert, among other means. Plaintiff should be allowed to
show, it is held, that the manufacturer did not use every means
available to it to alert physicians, including sending out salesmen
34
to visit each doctor.
The rules which can be deduced from cases like these are that
a complete warning is due of every risk involved. Further, the
consequences of doing or not doing certain things should be
spelled out. It is up to a jury to decide in every case whether the
defendant's conduct was careless or not. The amount and type of
warning and directions for use are to increase as the likelihood
and severity of injury increases.35 The cases also recognize that
the last and poorest way to prevent injury is the warning, and, if
it is to be relied upon, it must do the job.
The area of warning can be analyzed fully only in terms of
the related question of what it is that a supplier is to foresee and
guard against, and what type of user abuse is to be anticipated.
This is covered in question 12 below.
The adequacy of the warning may also be a problem where
the user: (a) speaks, reads, and understands a language which is
different from the one in which the warning is given; (b) is preliterate, illiterate or senile; or (c) is one who did not read the label
and is not the injured party, but whose conduct injures a bystander who did not have an opportunity to read it. These and
the many other similar problems, which constantly arise in product litigation, have to be solved in terms of the foreseeability of
the supplier and the social responsibilities which courts will be
willing to impose. Where there is a sizeable foreign speaking populace (like Spanish-speaking persons in many parts of the United
States), instructions should be multilingual. 6 Where a child may
34. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug Co., Inc., CCH PROD. LIAB. RPTR. 7003 (3d Cir. 1973);
Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1972); Sterling Drug Co. v. Cornish,
370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966); Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970);
Sterling Drug, Inc., v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,
416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo. 1967); Bine v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 422 S.W.2d 623 (Mo. 1968). These
seven cases-five of which are from Eighth Circuit territory-all hold that the Sterling
Drug Co. failed to make adequate warnings about Aralen, a drug sold for rheumatoid
arthritis and other conditions. A monument should be built by the plaintiffs' bar to the
counsel for the company which have so shaped the law by repeatedly trying and appealing
a rather losing set of facts. With respect to pharmaceutical salesmen, see Comment, The
Ubiquitous Detailman:An Inquiry Into His Functions and Activities and the Laws Relating to Them, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 183 (1973).
35. See notes 32 and 33 supra.
36. Suggested at 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS, § 28.7 (1956).
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use the product, and cannot be expected to read or understand
the label, the reasonable steps which might be taken would include issuing a warning to keep the product out of the hands of
children.3 7 Where the bystander is innocent, but there is an intervening act of the user in not heeding the labeling, the jury should
be free to determine whether or not there was a foreseeable break
3
in the chain of causation.

1

It is possible that some products can never be made safe
enough for general consumer use, notwithstanding the finest labeling. It is open to argument that such a product is defective per
1
se and should not be on the market.

9. Is there a continuing duty to warn and is there any duty to
recall, refund, or repair?
What responsibilities rest upon the supplier who discovers
something adverse about his product after he has released it onto
the market?
Three different situations may exist:
(a) a defect in the very product as sold is after-discovered;
(b) a safety device for the product, which was originally
made properly, is invented after its original sale-an improvement in the state of the art;
(c) while the same product is being mass-produced year
after year, a new risk is discovered which can be corrected or
warned about as to products turned out thereafter.
The steps the supplier might take are:
(1) alert the owner to the new information;
(2) offer to sell the new device or make the repair at
the owner's expense;
(3) recall the product and repair it, for free or at the
owner's expense;
(4) replace the product or refund the purchase price.
If the supplier discovers some time after the sale that he had
turned out a defective product with an injury-producing potential, (a) above, then he must take steps to prevent injury.30 This
37. Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962); Blue v. Drackett
Products Co., 143 So.2d 897 (Fla.App. 1962).
38. Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958); McLaughlin v. Mine Safety
Appliances Co., 11 N.Y. 2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962).
38.1 See, e.g., Denny v. Seaboard Lacquer Inc., 487 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1973). The
government also has the power to ban dangerous products. See note 9 supra.
39. Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W. 2d 627 (1959); Braniff
Airways, Inc., v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1969).
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would normally consist of alerting the owner-user of the problem,
and of steps which might be taken to correct it. The courts have
not yet said, as a matter of common law, that the supplier must
actually recall the product, let alone repair it at his own expense
(or replace it or refund its price). The recall duty is created statutorily for automobiles 0 and for other products.4 ' The effort which
would be required of the supplier to trace down the present users
of his products in a situation (a) or (b) above would depend upon
the nature of the product. Where a few large machines were
made, the owners would be notified directly. For a can of mushrooms perhaps, advertisements would be a reasonable step.
The analysis in the preceding paragraph ought not to turn on
whether or not the after-discovered risk was one produced originally by the defendant's fault. Since strict liability is involved in
either case, the mere defectiveness should necessitate the reparative actions. A different and lesser responsibility might exist,
however, where due to an advance in the state of the art a new
device or technique is created which will make the product substantially safer. For example, a new guard is designed. It might
be argued that the supplier has a duty at least to alert present
owners who it can identify that a new device is available, and to
make available the device, probably at cost.
In situation (c) above, where the particular product which is
going to cause injury is supplied after discovery of a defect, there
is obviously a duty to warn even if there was no duty when the
first product of this kind was turned out some time before. This
14 2
is the obvious application of the "continuing duty to warn.
10.

Of what vitality is the "allergy rule" today?

Although the allergy rule is, no doubt, alive and well in a
number of states,4 3 numerous inroads have been made by plaintiff's lawyers as well as by the courts into the doctrine, which, in
its purest form, would dismiss any product case in which the
plaintiffs injury was due to "allergy." The exceptions to the rule
or the proof used to overcome it are as follows:
40. National Traffic & Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1381 (Supp. 1974).
41. Consumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (Supp. 1974).
42. See, e.g., the Aralen cases, cited in note 34 supra.
43. See, e.g., Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App.
1965); Magee v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 214 Cal.App.2d 340, 29 Cal.Rptr. 322 (1963).
On the "allergy rule," see generally, 2 HURSH, ch. 8; 3 FRUMER § 28; Note, Products
Liability-StrictLiability and the Allergic Consumer, 45 TuL. L. Rv. 662 (1971).
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(a) showing that there was a breach of an express warranty of non-reactivity;"
(b) showing that a prescription drug was involved;'(c) arguing that there should be no "allergy rule," as it is
an irrational defense;
(d) showing that plaintiff reacted toxicly or directly and
not allergically, as by expert testimony on the exact causal
mechanism or by showing other injury, and by thus placing the
burden on the defendant proving the allergy;
(e) showing that plaintiff, though an allergic reactor, was
a member of a substantial minority of known reactors to the
ingredient in defendant's product;"
(f) putting the burden of proof onto defendant to prove
that plaintiff was in fact only the "one-in-a-million" who reacted, as by challenging the adequacy of the defendant's
reaction-gathering systems, and by showing how many reactions
never get reported to the company.
11.

How safe does the design of a product have to be?

With respect to the responsibility of manufacturers and other
defendants in product design cases, there has been a recent advance from the former simple requirement of "reasonable care"
in design. The cases are tending toward allowing the jury to consider the following aspects of safe design:
(a) whether there was any safety feature omitted which,
if present, would have prevented the accident;
(b) whether there was a better, safer way to make the
product;
(c) whether the product created an unnecessary risk of

injury;
(d) whether there was any unnecessary, ornamental feature which could have been left off without affecting function.
At what point the law stands today between "due care" in
design and a duty to create a foolproof product is not settled, and
it is likely that no clear line will ever be drawn. But, by permitting juries to ask the type of questions set out above, and by
allowing a verdict to be based upon failures in those areas, the
44. Spiegel v. Saks 34th Street, 26 App.Div.2d 660, 272 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d Dept. 1966)
(mem.).
45. Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v.
Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966); Krug v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 143 (Mo.
1967).
46. Howard v. Avon Products, Inc., 155 Colo. 444, 395 P.2d 1007 (1964); Esborg v.
Bailey Drug Co., 61 Wash.2d 347, 378 P.2d 298 (1963).
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47
supplier is drawn closer to the guarantor or foolproof standard.
Under this new approach, the plaintiff endeavors to show the jury
such facts as that competitors used the safety device which was
missing here, or that a "cotter pin costing a penny" could have
prevented the accident. The defendant points to such matters as
cost, function, and competition as narrowing the design choices.
He stresses "trade-offs." If the product would be unworkable
when the alleged missing feature was added, or would be so expensive as to be priced out of the market, that would be relevant
defensive matter.
Defendants often complain that the plaintiff is employing
hindsight in evaluating a product's design: after the accident,
plaintiff's engineers examine the product to see what could have
been done to prevent the accident. They then come to court to
testify as to whatever it was that should have been done when the
product was made. In a sense, the plaintiffs hindsight is the
defendant's foresight. It was the defendant who designed the
product, knew its working environment, employed the engineers
and consultant, and had the books at hand. So long as the stateof-the-art defense is retained, the "hindsight" approach seems
reasonable.
A peculiar subpart of design responsibilities arises out of the
"big machine" cases. In almost every case involving the very large
machine, the plaintiff (the little man) wins." In this situation,
courts and jurors seem to feel that there must have been something which the manufacturer could have done to have avoided
the accident. A recent case found that a giant earth mover that
backed over a worker should have been equipped with gongs,
lights, bells, mirrors-or anything which would have announced
its direction of motion.49
The new rules suggested in this discussion and in the warning
area (question 8 above) are, after all, but applications of the long
recognized responsibility of a supplier to be skilled and knowledgeable about the nature of the product which it markets, and

47. See, e.g., DiMeo v. Minster Machine Co., 388 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1968); Butler v.
L. Sonneborn Sons, Inc., 296 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1961); LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp.
373 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 219 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963), aff'd,
342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964); Varas v. Barco Mfg. Co., 205 Cal.App.2d 246, 22 Cal.Rptr.
737 (1962). See also cases cited note 48 infra.
48. See, e.g., Wirth v. Clark Equip. Co., 457 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1972); Pike v. Frank
G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal.Rptr. 629 (1970); Sutkowski v. Universal
Marion Corp., 5 Ill.App.3d 313, 281 N.E.2d 749 (1972).
49. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
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to keep abreast of new scientific developments which relate to the
product.50
As a sub-question, do the rules as to products generally
to the containers in which they come?
stated in this article apply
''51
The answer is "yes.
12. Does the supplier have to anticipate unintended uses of his
product, modifications of the product, failure of buyers to make
required modifications, and even actual abuse or stupidity on the
part of the user?
The answer to this question today verges on "yes." The supplier has to give careful evaluation to the total environment in
which his product will be put to work, and to the ways in which
his product may foreseeably be misused.5 2 This is an area of responsibility composed both of design liability and duty to warn.
It is also as much within the ambit of strict liability as it is within
negligence.
The parameters of the manufacturer's duties may be said to
be whatever is foreseeable by application of due care. The old
argument by suppliers that they were liable only for injuries arising out of intended uses, as compared to the broader category of
foreseeable uses, is now dead.5 3 The courts would recognize that
a screwdriver maker must anticipate, for example, that it will not
50. Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919 (8th Cir. 1970); Holladay v.
Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 255 F.Supp. 879 (S.D. Iowa 1966); Noel v. United Aircraft Corp.,
219 F. Supp. 556 (D. Del. 1963), aff'd 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964); La Plant v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 346 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. App. 1961) (leading case).
51. Gardner v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964); Lorenc
v. Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J. 56, 179 A.2d 401 (1962).
52. See Simpson Timber Co. v. Parks, 369 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. granted,
judgment vacated and remanded, 388 U.S. 459 (1967) (workmen walking on packaged
doors); Dennis v. Ford Motor Co., 471 F.2d 733 (3d Cir. 1973)(fifth wheel added to tractor);
Green v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 485 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1973) (child's finger caught
in window vent); Gardner v. Q. H. S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971) (hair rollers caught
fire); Zahora v. Harnischfeger Corp., 404 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1968) (crane operator's view
obstructed); Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1963) (mist of chemical into
eye); Colosimo v. May Dep't Store Co., 325 F.Supp. 609 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (dive into vinyllined pool); Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F.Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969) (bolt thrown
by power mower); Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal.App.3d 81, 91 Cal.Rptr. 301
(1970) (damaged laundry machine); Mieher v. Brown, 3 l.App. 3d 802, 278 N.E.2d 869
(1972) (truck in collision); Haberly v. Reardon Co., 319 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1958) (paint
flipped into child's eye); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350
N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973) (motorcycle in collision); Alfieri v. Cabot Corp., 13 N.Y.2d 1027, 195
N.E.2d 310, 245 N.Y.S.2d 600 (1963) (charcoal used indoors). See also cases cited notes
58 and 59 infra and discussion of crashworthiness, question 14 in text.
53. See cases cited in note 52 supra; cf. Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d
622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
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only be used to turn screws (intended use) but also to pry open
lids of cans, and must therefore make the shank strong enough
for this sort of use.
One can go a step further and say that the supplier, because
of its experience, may have to anticipate and guard against abuse
on the part of users." A leading case involves the woman who
heated her hair rollers according to instructions in a pan of water
on a stove." She was not told of the risks of boiling all of the water
out of the pan, although the manufacturer knew that to do so
would mean that the paraffin inside the rollers would be released.
The manufacturer also knew that the paraffin had a low flashpoint. The user decided to take a bath while waiting for the rollers
to heat, and fell asleep in the tub. The house burned down. The
supplier was held liable to the owner of the building for failure
to provide the user with complete information. Confronted with
a case like this, a plaintiff's lawyer would seek to prove the foreseeability of this hazard by such matters as previous accidents,
scientific tests, and knowledge of the general properties of the
contents of the product. The supplier is similarly under a duty
to gather information about the market experience of his product,
and to use that as feedback for improvement of design or label6
ingA
In legal terms, conduct on the part of a person which may
well amount to assumption of the risk or contributory negligence,
or even abuse of the product, may be within the ambit of what it
is that the manufacturer is to anticipate and guard against in the
design and labeling of his product. This is especially true where
a third party is the plaintiff, as in the hair roller case above, but
it is also true when the careless actor is the plaintiff. His own
conduct may not become a defense to the supplier's liability either because his participation is shifted to the defendant as its
the
responsibility to anticipate, or because under strict liability
57
all.
at
defense
a
be
not
may
involved
type of conduct
The common fact situation involving a brake press or similar
machine without a safety guard is a good way to cover two further
aspects of the "abuse" of the product situation. The machine may
54. See cases cited in note 52 supra.
55. Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971).
56. Feedback and complaint review has been argued in many cases but has not
resulted in a holding I can find. It is common and good industrial practice to analyze
warranty claims, complaints and suits, plus tracing products in the field.
57. Chapman v. Brown, 198 F.Supp. 78 (D.Haw. 1961), aff'd 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.
1962) (use near fire puts product to the test). See also question 3 in text.
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lack a guard either because the employer buying the machine has
failed to put on a guard which the supplier required or recommended, or because he may have removed a guard originally
provided by the supplier. Taking the former situation, some cases
would hold today that the manufacturer is not to be insulated
from liability merely because he has taken steps to shift to the
employer the burden of making the product safe." If the machine
could have been sold with a guard by the manufacturer he would
be under a duty to do so, and, in relation to the injured worker,
would not be able to assert a defense of intervening fault on the
part of the employer in failing to follow directions to install an
appropriate guard. Other action which might be required of the
manufacturer would be to inspect the machine after installation
to make sure that the employer had complied, or to affix an
irremovable sign from the machine stating the machine should
not be operated without a guard of some sort affixed, or to make
it inoperative without a guard.
In the other common machine problem, the employer has
removed the guard provided by the supplier, generally to increase
the productivity of the machine. Here some courts would also
allow the jury to determine whether the supplier was liable for an
injury. 9 The arguments open to the plaintiff are that the guard
should have been irremovable (or the machine rendered inoperable by its removal), or that the machine was defective or in breach
of a warranty if the guard had to be removed to provide the level
of production the employer sought. Again, a plate which warned
of the risks might be affixed.
Another aspect of intervening acts as potentially minimizing
the supplier's liability is that which commonly arises in the prescription drug cases. Here the prescribing doctor makes one of
two types of statements, either of which the manufacturer argues
tends to insulate him from liability in the situation where the
plaintiff is claiming a failure to warn because there is no statement about a certain side effect in the labeling. The doctor testifies either that he did not read and never does rely on the package
insert (hence, how can the absent warning be the proximate cause
58. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal.2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.Rptr. 896
(1964); Alvarez v. Felker Mfg. Co., 230 Cal.App.2d 987, 41 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1964); Finnegan
v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J.
402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 396.
59. Smith v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 194 F.Supp. 530 (E.D.Pa. 1961); Thompson v. Package
Machinery Co., 22 Cal.App.3d 188, 99 Cal.Rptr. 281 (1971).
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of the injury?) or that he knew all about the risks from his own
experience, reading of medical articles, and the like. Several recent decisions would nonetheless allow this sort of case to go to
the jury. 6 In a leading decision, the court found that the jury
might disregard these types of assertions by the doctor and find
that the manufacturer set out with a plan to overpromote the
product and to underwarn the profession.' Deception of the medical profession at large by failure to warn would be all that the
plaintiff would have to show, without any tying down of proximate cause in his own case.
13.

What is the vitality today of the "patent-latent"distinction?

6 2 is on the demise. The philosophy of that case and
Campo
those which followed it63 was that there could be no responsibility
for injuries resulting from patent defects, as compared to those
which were latent. Where there were "open and obvious" risks,
the worker or other person using the product was deemed to be
on a par with the manufacturer. This amounted to applying an
assumption of the risk defense as a matter of law, with the added
disadvantage that the defendant was relieved of the burden of
proving that plaintiff had subjectively appreciated a known risk.
Campo was and is an unrealistic approach to modern working conditions. 4 The uneducated employee assigned to work at a
machine which has dangerous whirling parts, unguarded by a
device which the experienced manufacturer could have utilized,
is on no par with that supplier. Momentary forgetfulness-an
accepted fact of industrial life-will cost him his arm. His only
means of avoiding injury is to give up his job, which is not a
realistic choice to him. Thus, it is more justifiable to stop drawing
lines of responsibility on latentcy-patentcy, and to allow the jury
to ask whether the defendant used due care under the circumstances, whatever the obviousness of the defect.
Judicial and jury dislike for the Campo rule may be ex60. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 CaI.3d 51 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973);
Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
61. Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal.3d 51, 507 P.2d 653, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1973).
62. Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
63. See, e.g., Blunk v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 143 Ind.App. 631, 242 N.E.2d 122
(1968); Albert v. J. & L. Engineering Co., 214 So.2d 212 (La. App. 1968); Blankenship v.
Morrison Machine Co., 255 Md. 241, 257 A.2d 430 (1969).
64. See criticism in 1 FRUMER § 7.02; cf. Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal.3d 465,
467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970) and other cases cited in note 48 supra.
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pressed not in outright rejection, but in accepting the plaintiff's
argument that the risk to him was not obvious, even though the
dangerous condition was itself patent. 5 Such a fine distinction
does not usually exist, however, and it is more honest to do away
with Campo directly.
What is the responsibilityto design a "crashworthy"
product?
The debate over a manufacturer's duty to design a "crashworthy" vehicle is all but over, now that the majority of appellate
courts considering the issue have refused to draw a line which
would immunize vehicle manufacturers from any responsibility
to use due care in making a car in which it is safe to have an
accident." They hold that the same amount of care which is due
in designing and building a car which creates an accident is due
in providing a safe environment in which to have an accident.
Automobile accidents are recognized as an every day fact of life
and within the ambit of foreseeability (see question 13 above).
Any discussion about "crashworthiness" should make the
following introductory points:
14.

(a) "Crashworthiness" is just one name, and not an allinclusive one, for a group of cases dealing with injuries which
occur after an accident has started to take place. Other terms
or concepts are "enhanced damages" or "second collision" damages, or one can approach in terms of the "unnecessary ornament."
(b) Crashworthiness applies to all products, not just vehicles.
(c) Crashworthiness applies to strict liability and negligence alike, as well as to "pure" (design defect) and "impure"
products.
As to the unnecessary ornament-the device on the vehicle
which serves little or no function and yet causes injury after an
65. Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill.
App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966); J. I. Case
Co. v. Sandefur, 245 Ind. 213, 197 N.E.2d 519 (1964); Bolm v. Triumph Corp., 33 N.Y.2d
151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973).
66. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Brandenburger v,
Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973); Bohm v. Triumph Corp., 33
N.Y.2d 151, 305 N.E.2d 769, 350 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1973); Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205
N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1973); Mickle v. Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969). See
generally, Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972); Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the
JudicialProcess, 55 CAL. L. REv. 645 (1967); Roda, ProductsLiability-The "Enhanced
Injury Case" Revisited, 8 T E FORUM 643 (1973).
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accident has started to take place-a recent case cast into liability the manufacturer of a vehicle which had hubcaps made of
sharp projecting metal pieces ("Ben Hur" type chariot).67 Plaintiffs leg was injured when the motorcycle on which she was a
passenger brushed up against the hubcap.
So intent have plaintiffs been in recent years on avoiding
dismissal in "second collision" cases that they have lost sight of
their ultimate ability to win the case before a jury or judge. The
plaintiff must bear the burden of proof that had the vehicle been
designed as claimed, the injury would not have occurred or at
least would have been measurably less. Better design of a gas
tank might not be the means of preventing fire burns if the car
was involved in so mighty a collision that no car could have
survived structurally.
& PARTIES
15. What is the status today of a cause of action for fraud or
misrepresentation?
Although a cause of action for fraud is little used today in
product liability cases, it is a good alternate basis for recovery
and, in a few cases, may be the best if not the only way to get
the case to the jury.69 In addition, a cause of action based upon
fraud may have a longer statute of limitations than one for negligence, strict liability, or breach of warranty, and may open the
door to otherwise inadmissible proof.
The common law action for deceit or misrepresentation has
been supplemented by a strict liability type of fraud, set forth in
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402B. Section 402B is a little
used section which places liability upon the supplier of a chattel
where injury follows reliance by a user upon misrepresentations
about a material fact pertaining to the character or quality of the
product, even though the misrepresentations were not made negligently or fraudulently, and even though there is no contractual
relationship between the seller and the injured party. This is "no
fault" fraud. Thus, as in a leading case, where injury follows an
attempt to use a tractor for something mechanically beyond its
C.

OTHER FORMS OF LIABILITY

67. Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); see also
Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co., 503 S.W. 2d 516 (Tenn. 1973).
68. See the discussion in Rheingold, Pointers on a "Crashworthy" Plea, 8 TRIAL, 57
(March/April 1972).
69. See generally, 1 HuRsH ch. IV. A good example is Toole v. Richardson-Merrell,
Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967).
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ability, but something of which it has been said to be capable,
liability follows even though the misrepresentation was entirely
innocent. 0
16.

What is the role of a cause of actionfor breach of an express
warranty?

Even with the general replacement of the implied warranty
action by strict liability, the action based upon breach of an
express warranty has life today, and in a few instances may be
the best route to recovery. 7' Whether this action is regarded (improperly) as arising out of provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code, or (properly) out of common law, the essential elements are
a positive affirmation about the product upon which the user has
relied. A good example of the modern express warranty action is
a suit for an allergic reaction to a cosmetic which was sold with
the statement on its label that it was "nonallergenic" or "safe."
Here it has been held that the manufacturer is liable for breach
of express warranty, even though it would not be liable because
of a defense based upon the "allergy rule," were it sued in negligence.72 Not every positive statement about a product may, however, give rise to the action, since some promises are so broad as
73
to be puffing.
17.

Under what circumstances may punitive damages be
awarded in a product case?

States differ in their standards for allowing punitive damages, but in most, proof of gross, wanton, or reckless conduct (or,
of course, intentional conduct) merits the jury's evaluation of
whether such damages should be awarded. 74 Some states have the
"complicity doctrine"-that the management of the company
must have participated in some way in the conduct-a rule which
often creates problems in product cases. Examples of situations
in which exemplary damages have been awarded are: a new drug
70. Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 217 Tenn. 400, 398 S.W.2d 240 (1966).
71. See generally, 1 HURSH ch. 3, § 3.36 ff. Among recent cases see Pritchard v.
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co.,
278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967).
72. See Spiegel v. Saks 34th Street, 26 App.Div. 2d 660, 272 N.Y.S.2d 972 (2d Dept.
1966) (mem.).
73. See, e.g., Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 80 N.J. Super. 184, 189,
193 A.2d 275, 277 (1963) ("stronger, sharper, and longer-lived. . . best all-purpose disc
74. Generally, but from the defense point of view, see Tozer, Punitive Damages and
Products Liability, 39 INs. COUNSEL J. 300 (1972).
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as to which it was shown that the manufacturer concealed from
physicians its awareness of its potential to cause injury, as shown
in prior investigations,"5 or a druggist who knowingly sold a
6
prescription drug to a purchaser without a prescription. 7
18.

Who are the newer parties,plaintiff and defendant, to product litigation?

The discussion in this article centers mainly upon the manufacturer, who is by far the most commonly sued defendant. There
are, however, an ever-expanding number of persons with some
connection, direct or remote, with the chain of product distribution who are potential defendants. At the same time, the type of
plaintiffs are growing. This expansion is true both in negligence
and strict liability, although it is in the latter that the main
growth-and some controversy-exists today.
a. Defendants
77
1. The maker of a component part;
2. the assembler or subassembler, or the packager of the final
8
product;
79
3. the wholesaler, distributor or middleman;
4. the importer;" or one who holds the product out to be his
s
own; '

5.
6.

the retailer;"
the new car dealer;8

75. Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1973); Toole v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 251 Cal.App.2d 689, 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967). But see Roginsky v.
Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967).
76. Cox v. Laws, 145 So.2d 703 (Miss. 1962).
77. See generally, 1 FRUMIER § 9. In a most interesting case, E.I. duPont de Nemours
& Co. v. McCain, 414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969), it was held that while du Pont only made
a harmless part of the final compound which exploded and which constituted only 2% of
the whole, it was liable for failure to test the final compound since it allowed its name to
be placed prominently on the label.
78. See generally, 1 FRUMER § 10.
79. Among strict liability cases, see Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal.App.2d
228, 71 Cal.Rptr. 306 (1968); Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966). Among
negligence cases, see McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181
N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962); 2 FRUMER § 20.
80. Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961).
81. Carney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962); Dudley Sports Co.
v. Schmitt, 279 N.E. 2d 266 (Ind. App. 1972).
82. 2 FRUMER ch. 18; on strict liability, see HURSH § 5A:24 (Supp. 1973).
83. J. C. Lewis Motor Co. v. Simmons, 128 Ga. App. 113, 195 S.E.2d 781 (1973); Ford
v. Flagherty, 294 N.E.2d 437 (Mass. App. 1972), aff'd Mass. - 305 N.E.2d 112
(1973).
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7. the seller of used or reconditioned products;84
85
8. the repairer or other contractor;
9. the bailor;8"
10. the operator of a store in which the public uses machines;"
11. the vendor of real estate, the contractor, the architect, the
builder, the lessor of real estate, and even the financier of a hous8
ing development;
12. licensors; 9
13. the guarantor, endorser or tester; 9
14. the advertising or promoting agency;"
92
15. the restaurant serving food;
3
16. the beauty shop applying a hair product;
17. the hospital or physician using a product while rendering
84. See generally, 2 FRUMER § 19.03(5).
85. See 1 FRUMER § 5.03(3). One case has gone a step further holding liable to an
injured third person a gas station operator who negligently inspected and certified a
vehicle, Buszta v. Souther, 102 R.I. 609, 232 A.2d 396 (1967).
86. As to strict liability, see Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85
Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Service, 45 N.J. 434, 212
A.2d 769 (1965). As to negligence, see 1 FRUMER § 5.03(4).
87. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal.App.3d 319, 82 Cal.Rptr. 420 (1970).
88. As to builders and contractors, see, as to strict liability, Kriegler v. Eichler
Homes, Inc., 269 Cal.App. 2d 224, 74 Cal.Rptr. 749 (1969); State Stove Mfg. Co. v.
Hodges, 189 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Schipper v. Levitt
& Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); and in negligence, see 1 FRUMER § 5.03(2)(a).
As to vendors, who make an implied warranty of fitness, see Cochran v. Keeton, 252 So.2d
313 (Ala. 1971); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969) (leased premises);
Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743 (Ky. 1969). As to financiers of housing developments,
see Connor v. Great Western Savings and Loan Ass'n, 69 Cal.2d 850, 447 P.2d 609, 73 Cal.
Rptr. 369 (1968). As to architects and designers, see Audlane Lumber & Builders Supply,
Inc., v. D. E. Britt Associates, Inc., 168 So.2d 333 (Fla.App. 1964).
89. In Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal.App.3d 711, 101 Cal.Rptr. 314 (1972), a
licensor of a trademark was held strictly liable for the conduct of the licensee who made
a defective product under that name. See also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. McCain,
414 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1969); Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
90. Hempstead v. General Fire Extinguisher Corp., 269 F.Supp. 109 (D.Del.1967)
(liability of Underwriters Laboratories which allowed its label to be affixed which represented that it tested product, a fire extinguisher); Hanberry v. Hearst Corp., 276 Cal.
App.2d 680, 81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1969) (liability of publisher of GOOD HOUSEKEEPING which
gave "Seal of Approval" to shoes); see also, Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d 181 (1971); Note, Tort
Liability of Independent Testing Agencies, 22 RuTrGERs L. REv. 299 (1968).
91. I know of no case which holds an advertiser responsible, but such liability is
predictably close in coming.
92. Imposing strict liability, see Wachtel v. Rosol, 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970);
breach of warranty liability, Hockberg v. O'Donnell's Restaurant, Inc., 272 A.2d 846 (D.C.
App. 1971); Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc., 347 Mass. 421, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964)
(rejects reliance upon UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE).
93. Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969). See generally, cases
on strict liability in service cases, Annot., 29 A.L.R.3d 1425 (1970).
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medical treatment (service),94 including the transfusion of
blood;"
18. a whole industry, and its trade association;9"
19. the federal government.97
b. Plaintiffs
1. A bystander;9"
2. a class of injured parties;99
3. a recipient of a gift;' 9
4. a rescuer.' 0'
D. PROOF
19. What must the plaintiff show on the issue of causation?
As every school boy knows, the term causation covers two
related matters: cause-in-fact (did the product cause the injury?)
and proximate cause (did the defect or conduct cause the injury?). As to cause-in-fact, this is usually a matter of simple
proof. Most cases are so clear that no expert evidence would be
required, as for example, where glass from an exploding bottle
flies into a person's eye. In other situations, however, the chief
battle at trial may very well be over factual causation. In most
drug injury cases, for example, there is nothing peculiar caused
by the particular drug, and the defendant lays great stress on
alternate causation-that the injury complained of was caused by
94. So far not held strictly liable, Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d
539 (1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968);
Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital, 20 Cal.App.3d 1022, 98 Cal.Rptr. 187 (1972); but see
Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F.Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (hospital). See
Annot., 54 A.L.R. 3d 258 (1973).
95. Cases imposing strict liability are cited in note 15 supra.
96. Hall v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F.Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972)
(where there was evidence that they had adopted a common plan to remove identifying
marks from their products, blasting caps); see also Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products
Corp., CCH PROD. LIARILiTY RvrR. 7017 (5th Cir. 1973) (asbestosis from contact with
multiple manufacturer's production).
97. Strict liability held inapplicable in Toppi v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 513
(E.D. Pa. 1971); but see Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (liability
for false reports on vaccine).
98. Both strict liability and negligence have been applied, see HURsH § 5A:20 (Supp.
1973). A leading, recent case is Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345
N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
99. So far the courts have refused to recognize as a true class a group of plaintiffs
injured physically by the same product. See Gans & Rheingold, Multiple Litigation, 3
FRUMER ch. 16 A.
100. Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1939); as to strict liability, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment 1 (1965).
101. Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306
N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
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the disease for which the product was being given, or that it was
due to another drug, or that the condition was "idiopathic" or
"congenital." Auto cases present similar problems, wherein the
defendant calls the alleged defect "impact damage"-a product
of the crash.
Proximate cause presents greater hurdles for plaintiff. In
fact, one of the most common reasons for a plaintiff's losing a case
at trial or upon appellate review is failure properly to demonstrate a proximate link between the defendant's conduct or defect
and the injury. The typical case is the user who complains that
there should have been a better warning on the product, and yet
testifies that he did not read the label before first using the prod1 Or, in a drug case where
uct.02
it is claimed that the manufacturer failed to do adequate testing before marketing, the plaintiff
may be undercut by the fact that when tests were done later (even
after the injury) they proved negative. Hence, if done earlier, they
could not have predicted plaintiffs injury. There has been some
loosening of proximate cause requirements in the situations
where potentially intervening conduct is involved, as discussed in
question 12 above.
20. What degree of proof of identity of the product is required?
On rare occasions, plaintiffs presentation may be tripped up
on an identity question: is the product which is in the courtroom
or the one tested by plaintiffs expert the very one which caused
his injury? Generally this issue does not arise, but when it does,
the plaintiff should be prepared with proof of the chain of control. 10 1 It is well to have the product labeled at the time it is
removed from the car or is brought into the lawyer's office, and
then to have proof how and when it was sent to the expert and
protected by him there. Photographs are also helpful on control
issues where they show unmounting and testing.
21. What are the ways to prove the existence of a defect?
The plaintiff has many ways of proving the existence of the
102. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d
430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962). In Blue v. Drackett Products Co., 143 So.2d 897 (Fla. App.
1962) plaintiff was allowed to testify directly to the proximate cause issue. It was held that
the mother who had purchased a product which injured her child should have been
allowed to testify that if she had been warned of the risks, she would not have kept the
product where the child could find it. See also Jacobs v. Technical Chem. Co., 472 S.W.2d
191 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971), rev'd 480 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. 1972).
103. Cf. Rheingold, supra note 5, at 339; 1 HuRSH § 1:19.
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defect, where such is contested. The usual means is to call an
expert to testify as to the results of his examination of the product. This witness makes the assertion, to whatever degree of certainty is required, and perhaps demonstrates visually to the jury
the existence of the defect. In some cases the defect may be so
obvious as to require no expert proof, such as the glass fragments
from the bottle that exploded.
The sources of proof of defect which are available to plaintiff
include the following:" 4
(a) He may show the nature of the product and its capability
of producing the type of harm which is sued for, as for example
the consumption of food showed later to be contaminated.
(b) He may rely upon the pattern of evidence, as for example
using evidence of the point of collision or the movement of a car
as shown by its tire marks as being indicative of the type of defect
which has caused the loss of control of the vehicle.
(c) He may show facts about the life history of the product.
including similar previous failures or injuries, or even injuries
which it caused after the event. This might include repairs made
to the product afterward. 10'1
(d) He may point to what similar products have done, where
the similar product is another one just like the one in the accident
(another bottle from the same batch) or just bears some generic
similarity (a competitor's product).
(e) Elimination of alternative cause is usually insufficient in
itself to help the plaintiff provide the existence of a defect, but it
is a most helpful means of convincing the jury that there was an
actionable defect.
Does the mere happening of an accident in itself prove or
tend to prove the existence of a defect? In some recent cases the
answer has been most decidedly yes,105 although there are many
older cases which state that the mere happening of an accident
does not give rise to proof of defect."' Those decisions which have
104. Rheingold, supra note 5, at 327-339. Phelan and Foer, Problems of Proof in
Defective Design Litigation, 54 CHI.B.REC. 257 (1973).
104.1 See also questions 26 and 30 in text.
105. See, e.g., Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r. Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969); Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 70 Cal.2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Stewart v.
Budget Rent-a-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 470 P.2d 240 (1970); Marathon Battery Co. v.
Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d 900 (Okla. (1965); Vanek v. Kirby, 253 Ore. 494, 450 P.2d 778 (1969);
MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969) (observing that
less direct proof is needed in a strict liability case than in a negligence case).
106. See Rheingold, supra note 5, at 337.
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allowed a case to go to the jury on nothing more than a demonstration that the accident took place, tend to deal by and large
with the non-household type of product. Here, within the experience of the ordinary worker or consumer the product would not
have failed but for the existence of a defect. In a leading case, a
huge machine malfunctioned as it had never before, and amputated a worker's arm. No more proof than the malfunction was
required in order to submit the case to the jury on the issue of
defectiveness.1 17 Indeed, the Pennsylvania cases have recently
held that evidence of malfunction is sufficient proof of defect to
send the case to the jury.' 8
22. Must the specific causal mechanism or defect be proved?
The courts do not generally require that the plaintiff prove
the exact or specific defect or the causal mechanism which caused
the injury.' 9 In the typical case, involving an automobile accident, plaintiff must point to some part or system which caused
the car to go off the road, but he is not required to show exactly
how a particular part broke down. Or, if he points, for example,
to a broken steering geer, he is not required to show why the metal
broke in the way it did. Of course, the plaintiff is well advised to
offer as much proof as possible on the specific cause, since it helps
to convince a jury that there was a defect which proximately
caused the accident.
23.

To what extent may circumstantialevidence be relied upon
to prove the existence of a defect?

Circumstantial evidence and inference generally may be relied upon in part or in full to prove the fact of a defect, and its
role in the production of the injury for which plaintiff is suing."'
In the usual product case there is little "direct" evidence of what
defect caused the accident and it is, therefore, often necessary to
rely strongly upon circumstance.
A good illustration of proving a case wholly on circumstantial
evidence involves the exploding grinding wheel. In one case, the
107. Greco v. Bucciconi Eng'r. Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969).
108. In addition to Greco v. Buccioni Eng'r. Co., 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969) and
MacDougall v. Ford Motor Co., 214 Pa. Super. 384, 257 A.2d 676 (1969), see Harking v.
Ford Motor Co., 437 F.2d 276 (3d Cir. 1970); Kridler v. Ford Motor Co., 422 F.2d 1182
(3d Cir. 1970); Frankel v. Lull Engr. Co., 334 F.Supp. 913 (E.D.Pa. 1971).
109. See Rheingold, supra note 5, at 329. See also Brizendine v. Visador Co., 305
F.Supp. 157 (D.Ore. 1969); Franks v. National Diary Products Corp., 282 F.Supp. 528
(D.Tex. 1968).
110. Rheingold, supra note 5, at 340-343.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss2/7

30

Rheingold:
The Expanding
of the Product Supplier: A Primer
A Primer
Liability:Liability
Expanding

wheel was destroyed by the explosion and there was nothing left
to inspect. Plaintiffs proof that the wheel had been defectively
made was based upon an inspection of the defendant's factory
and its manufacturing process. It was shown that the process used
lent itself to a lack of homogeneity in the grinding wheel's composition. An expert showed how this could make the wheel prone to
disintegrate while being used." ' Similar problems and solutions
can be found in the situation where an automobile goes out of
control and is destroyed beyond the point of being capable of
being inspected. Thereafter, we may imagine, the manufacturer
which was of the type
issues a recall notice describing a defect
2
that could have caused the accident."
24.

What is the applicationof res ipsa loquitur to product litigation?

Most courts would apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
a product case as it would in any other type of case."' The inherent hurdles in the application of the doctrine, most notably proof
that the defendant had "control" over the chattel, does, however,
tend to limit its usefulness. More importantly, the very type of
case which is so obvious, that "res ipsa" will carry it to the jury,
is the type where expert testimony can readily be obtained. To
rely on "res ipsa" here is to pass up an opportunity to prove a
particularly strong case. Through the more convincing mode of
expert testimony, attorneys sometimes try to use "res ipsa" to
repair a gap in the case on the causation issue. Properly used, the
doctrine would be of no assistance in proving that there was a
defect in the product or that it caused the accident. "Res ipsa,"
rather, is concerned with the liability issue."'
The case of the exploding bottle makes a wonderful exercise
in putting together many of the points covered so far, not only in
this proof section but in legal theories as well. We assume that
plaintiff is the husband of the purchaser of a bottle of club soda,
which explodes just as he goes to open it at home. The traditional
111. Trowbridge v. Abrasive Co., of Phila., 190 F.2d 825, 828 (3d Cir. 1951). See also
Norton Co. v. Harrelson, 278 Ala. 85, 176 So.2d 18 (1965).
112. In Carroll v. Ford Motor Co., 462 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970), an afterreceived recall letter was held not to be sufficient proof of the existence of a defect.
113. See Rheingold, supra note 5, at 338. See generally 1 FRUmER § 12.03. Leading
recent res ipsa loquiturcases include Grey v. Hayes-Simmons Chemical Co., 310 F.2d 291
(5th Cir. 1962) and Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal.3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 769 (1971).
114. See Rheingold, supra note 5, at 338.
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defendants are the "Ma and Pa Grocery Store" which sold it to
the plaintiffs wife, the bottler, and the bottle manufacturer. Assuming that the wife cleaned up the pieces of glass and threw
them into the garbage, it would seem that the best action would
lie against the retailer. The best theory against him would be in
strict liability."' Some courts would refuse to apply res ipsa loquitur because of doubts about proof of "control.""' There is no easy
way to tie in the more remote defendants without the glass pieces,
unless one wants to use the approach discussed in the preceding
section as to grinding wheels, or some other special circumstantial proof. Assuming the bottle fragments are around for an expert
to examine, and that after reconstruction he determines that
there was a seam defect or an uneven wall, strict liability should
apply up the line to everyone." 7 As to a negligence theory, it
would have to be shown that the defect was due to careless construction or that it went undetected because of a negligent failure
to inspect the product."'
25. How is "notice" proved? Are official reports, congressional
hearings, and articles in the press admissible?
Proof that the defendant was on notice of certain information
pertaining to risks of his product before the accident can come
from many sources, a number of which are covered elsewhere:
other complaints (question 26) and the very nature of the product
(question 21).
In addition, the plaintiff often wishes to show that the defendant was placed on notice of the defect or danger of his product
by virtue of some publication which had appeared before the time
of his own injury. As a common example, in a drug injury case,
the plaintiff offers copies of articles which had appeared in the
medical press which reported the same injuries from use of the
115. See Read v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 264 Cal.App.2d 404, 70 Cal.Rptr. 454 (1968);
Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Works. v. Ponder, 443 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1969); Falstaff
Brewing Corp. v. Williams, 234 So.2d 620 (Miss. 1970); Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co.,
430 Pa. 176, 242 A.2d 231 (1968).
116. E.g., Davis v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 271 Cal.App.2d 365, 76 Cal.Rptr. 490 (1969);
Rafferty v. Hull Brewing Co., 350 Mass. 359, 215 N.E.2d 85 (1966).
117. See note 115 supra.
118. As with every other type of product, it is important to understand the technology
involved. See Dingwall, Exploding Bottles, 11 NAACA L.J. 158 (1953), in SCHREIBER &
RHEINGOLD, PRODUCTs LIABILITY 14:57 (1st ed. 1967), and Spangenberg, ExplodingBottles,
24 OHIO ST. L.J. 516 (1963), in SCHREIBER & RHEINGOLD, supra,at 12:75. (A second edition
of SCHEIBER & RHEINGOLD, supra, will be issued in 1974.)
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very same product."1 These articles are often limited to the issue
of notice (as compared to a causation issue); sometimes only
summaries or statistics are allowed and not the whole report with
its details of the injuries. The basis for admissibility is that these
reports are not hearsay because they are asserted not for the truth
of their contents, but for the mere fact that they came to the
defendant's attention; they might also be admitted as the basis
of expert testimony. ' Of course, the use of journal articles is not
limited to medical cases. In machine cases, the plaintiff may have
turned up magazine or book discussions on the issue of risks with
a certain design.12 ' In counterbalancing fashion, the defendant
may be expected to offer proof, if it is so, that there was little or
nothing in the literature up to the time of plaintiff's injury to alert
it to any risky potential of the product.
It sometimes happens that a congressional committee has
held hearings or made reports on the product involved, before the
time of the accident. Or, a regulatory body may have made general pronouncements about it. Here the plaintiff offering such
proof may argue an official report's exception to the hearsay rule,
but this rationalization extends with some difficulty to hearings
of a body as compared to its report. 12
26. Are other complaints and similaroccurrences,both before or
after the accident in question admissable?And what about proof
of a long period of safe use?
On liability issues (notice), prior accidents, complaints, or
the like are generally admissible.2 3 The plaintiff has a number of
119. On drug litigation see GOODMAN &

RHEINGOLD, DRUG LIAn1LrrY:

A

LAWYER'S

(PLI 1970). See Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958); Webb
v. Fuller Brush Co., 378 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1967).
120. Proposed Rule 703 of the proposed FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE would allow a
witness to base his opinion testimony on matters which are technically hearsay if of a type
"reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." See also Rheingold, The Basis
of Medical Testimony, 15 VAND.L.REv. 473 (1962).
121. In Blair v. American Motors Corp., 473 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1972), results of a
testing laboratory study (Cornell Aeronautical Laboratories Automobile Crash Injury Research) were held admissible as some evidence of good design which the defendant could
have used, but did not, in designing its door latches.
122. Official reports were allowed in Wright v. Carter Products, 244 F.2d 353 (2d Cir.
1957) (on notice issue); Stashieukevich v. Nicolls, 168 F.2d 474 (1st Cir. 1948) (not a
product case); Love v. Wolf, 226 Cal.App.2d 378, 88 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1964). Contra, Green
v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally 1 FRUMER § 12.05HANDBOOK

.06.
123. See, e.g. Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602 (3d Cir. 1958), cert.
denied 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Spruill v. Boyle-Midway, Inc., 308 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1962);
Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1971); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60
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proofs to make in order to make such evidence admissible, including: the similarity of the other event to the one in question, the
fact that the event came to the attention of the defendant, and
foundational matters such as that the sheet of paper representing
the complaint which the plaintiff has found in the defendant's
files is a genuine copy." 4 Events coming to the attention of the
defendant only after the accident in question (or more accurately,
in time before the accident for the defendant to have been able
to do anything about it), would appear to have no relevance on
notice issues. They are relevant on the causation questions, however, where the issue is whether the product is capable of causing
a certain accident or injury. ' Here an event occurring on the eve
of trial is as relevant on causation issues as one which occurred
long before plaintiff was injured.
The defendant may want to prove a prior history of no accidents, either as to the product in question (as some proof that it
was without a specific defect) or as to its line of products (to show
that it had no notice of defect). At least in negligence actions,
such proof should be admissible.' 6 Such proof is often of great
weight in allergy cases (see question 10 above). Subsequent safe
history is irrelevant on liability issues but is as relevant on causation as subsequent accidents are pertinent for the plaintiff.
There is no basis to establish a conclusive defense for a manufacturer merely because there had been a long history of safe use
with the particular product involved before plaintiff's injury occurred. Large machine presses, for example, may be operated for
20 years without an accident occurring (that is to say, without the
plaintiff being able to prove otherwise). This fact, while pertinent
to the jury in determining whether in fact there was a defect in
the machine (plaintiff might have caused the accident himself in
some fashion), should in no way preclude proof of defect.' A
N.J. 413, 290 A.2d 286 (1972). See generally 1 FRUMER § 12.01[2]. As to the discovery of
other complaints, see Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1430. See also Annot., 95 A.L.R.2d 681.
124. See discussion of the practical problems of introducing records from the manufacturer's files into evidence, Gans & Rheingold, ch. 46A in 3 FRUMER, at 16A-83-86.
125. I am unaware of any case which is a clear holding on this point, although it is
often raised in trials, especially in prescription drug cases. The courts generally allow
pretrial discovery of such complaints on the causation issue, see Annot., 20 A.L.R. 3d 1430;
see Dipangrazio v. Salmonson, 64 Wash.2d 720, 393 P.2d 936 (1964) (evidence of risk of
people running into glass doors admissible on issue of whether such doors are dangerous.
126. Persons v. Garlinger Carrier Co., 227 F,2d 337 (9th Cir. 1955); Hardman v.
Helene Curtis Industries, Inc., 48 Ill.App.2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964); Savage v. Peterson
Distrib. Co., Inc. 379 Mich. 197, 150 N.W.2d 804 (1967). Contra, Roberts v. United States,
316 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1963).
127. Carney v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 309 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1962); Balido v. Im-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol2/iss2/7

34

Rheingold:
The Expanding
of the Product Supplier: A Primer
Expanding
Liability:Liability
A Primer

similar problem arises when a building falls after many years, and
the original builder, contractor, or even architect are sought to be
held responsible.
27. May the plaintiff prove deviation from a standard created
by law or in an industrial code? If so, what is the effect of proof
of deviation?
Increasingly today, courts are admitting proof of the existence of standards of all sorts for product design and construction.
Such is the impact of proof of deviation of standard upon the trier
of the fact that it behooves the lawyer during preparation of every
type of product case to search for possible applicable standards
from every conceivable source.' 28 The sources may be arranged as
follows (with decreasing force):
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

statutes and ordinances;
regulations and codes passed pursuant to (a);
industry wide standards and codes;
defendant's own rules and regulations.

The potential legal and evidentiary uses to which departure
from these standards may be put by plaintiff are as follows:
(1) to create a cause of action, either expressly or inferentially;'2
(2) to give standing to sue;'3
3
(3) to create negligence per se liability;' '
proved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal.App. 3d 633, 105 Cal.Rptr. 890 (1973); King v. Douglas
Aircraft Co., 159 So.2d 108 (Fla.App. 3d Dist. 1963); Bums v. Pennsylvania Rubber &
Supply Co., 117 Ohio App. 12, 189 N.E.2d 645 (1961).
128. There are numerous sources for determining the existence of standards. By far
the best compilation for lawyers is ROBB, PHILO & GOODMAN, LAWYERS DESK REFERENCE
(4th ed. 1971) (also very strong on experts and organizations). The most comprehensive
set of standards is put out by the American National Standards Institute (formerly ASA)
1430 Broadway, N.Y., N.Y. 10018, which issues annually a free list of all of its standards.
Other groups with multiple standards are the American Society for Testing and Materials
(Philadelphia); National Fire Prevention Association (Boston); and National Safety
Council (Industrial Data Sheets-Chicago). was to adhissibility problems, see Note,
Admissibility of Safety Codes, Rules and Standardsin Negligence Cases, 37 TENN. L. REv.
581 (1970).
129. Few federal or state laws regulating products expressly create a private right of
action for the injured consumer. An exception is under § 23 of the Consumer Product
Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), which authorizes suit for injuries due to a knowing
or willful violation of a safety standard, order, or rule of the commission. This is extremely
limited and in practice will probably be of little use to litigants.
130. I am unaware of any product statute, state or federal, which grants a private
party any special standing to sue such as exists in some environmental legislation.
131. As was allowed in Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. Eustler, 276 F.2d 455 (6th Cir.
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(4) to establish a standard by which to measure the defendant's conduct as some evidence of want of due care on his
part;' 32
33
(5) to evidence a defect for strict liability purposes.'

The most interesting and controversial area of standards has
been the effort by plaintiffs to use non-official standardsindustry sponsored or trade association standards-as a measure
of the care up to which the defendant should have come. For
example, in a power lawn mower case, plaintiff was allowed to
prove what the ANSI standards were for proper design of the
controls, blades and the like-conditions with which defendant's
mower did not comply. 34 While it would be proper in these
cases to prove the standard itself as a separate item of evidence,
and then read it to the jury, a preferable way to get the standard
before the jury is through expert testimony. Not only does the
expert explain it to the jury, but the court has less trouble with
admissibility, especially if it wants to indulge in the concept that
it is not being admitted but is taken only as the "basis" of the
expert's testimony.
28. Is there a defense based upon compliance with standards,
compliance with custom and practice,or governmental approval?
On the same liability issues as just covered in question 27,
the defendant may be expected to offer proof on the following
matters:
1960) (Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act); Gober v. Revlon, Inc., 317 F.2d 47 (4th Cir.
1963); Steagall v. Dot Mfg. Corp., 223 Tenn. 428, 446 S.W.2d 515 (1969) (Federal Hazardous Substances Act); Fowler v. Coastal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 252 S.C. 579, 167 S.E.2d
572 (1969) (state pure food and drug act).
132. See Swearngin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1967); Brandon
v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 220 F.Supp. 855 (E.D. Pa. 1963), afl'd per curiam 342 F.2d
519 (3d Cir. 1965) (en banc); Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689, 60
Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Waite v. American Creosote Works, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 410 (Minn.
1973); Ward v. City Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co. of Kansas City, 379 S.W.2d 614 (Mo. 1964);
Nordstrom v. White Metal Rolling & Stamping Corp., 75 Wash. 2d 629, 453 P.2d 619
(1969) (en banc).
In Brooman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 387 F.2d 732 (6th Cir. 1967) it was held error
to admit an ASA standard which had been published after the lawn mower in question
was made. See generally, Note, The Admissability of Safety Codes, Rules and Standards
in Negligence Cases, 37 TENN. L. REv. 581 (1970); Annots., 75 A.L.R.2d 778; 80 A.L.R.2d
488, 507; 81 A.L.R.2d 229, 247;
The standard may arise out of what the custom and practice of others in the industry
were at the time the product was made. Blohm v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., Inc., 380 F.2d 341
(10th Cir. 1967).
133. See Price v. Buckingham Mfg. Co., 110 N.J.Super. 462, 266 A.2d 140 (1970).
134. Swearngin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 356 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1967).
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(a) he complied with the statutes and regulations relating to
his product;
(b) his product meets, if not exceeds, the standards set by the
applicable industrial codes;
(c) a public regulatory body licensed or otherwise approved
the marketing of the product;
(d) the labeling and other conditions of marketing have been
reviewed by the governmental agency which has allowed the
product to stay on the market;
(e) he was doing what other manufacturers at that time were
doing, and hence he complied with the custom and practice in
the trade.
There is little doubt that most courts should and would
admit most of the proof just mentioned, but the force of the proof
should only be as some evidence of due care on the part of the
defendant.'35 It would be improper to allow compliance with any
law, or the fact of explicit government approval, to cause the issue
of whether the defendant was negligent or otherwise liable to be
removed from the consideration of the jury. To do so is to confuse
the jury's role with the purpose of governmental oversight. The
latter sets a minimum acceptable standard, whereas the former
is whatever the common law says it is. Such standards as those
set under the Flammable Fabrics Act'36 have shown that the community (jurors') standard can and should be set much higher
than whatever it is that the industry is able to work out in a
behind-the-doors setting with bureaucracy. 13 There is also a
question as to whether defendant is offering anything more than
self-serving proof when he offers to show that he complied with
private standards which he himself helped to promulgate.
Even though governmental approval is not conclusive on the
jury in its evaluation of the product, that fact is highly persuasive, as any trial lawyer knows. Many juries find a great bit of
difficulty in being put in the role of second guessing the govern135. See, e.g., Savage v. Peterson Distrib. Co., Inc. 379 Mich. 197, 150 N.W.2d 804
(1967); see also cases cited in note 137 infra, and Annotations in note 132 supra.
136. 15 U.S.C. § 1191 et seq.
137. Raymond v. Riegel Textile Corp., 484 F.2d 1025 (1st Cir. 1973) (Flammable
Fabrics Act); Griffin v. Planters Chemical Corp., 302 F.Supp. 937 (D.S.C. 1969) (federal
pesticide reguations); Nowland v. Shoe Corp. of America, 47 F.R.D. 6 (D. Del. 1969) (ASA
standard for ladders); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 42, 290 A.2d 281 (1972) (industrial standards); Sherman v. M. Lowenstein & Sons, Inc., 28 App. Div. 2d 922, 282
N.Y.S.2d 142 (2d Dept. 1967) (Flammable Fabrics Act); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263,
282 A.2d 206 (1971). Contra, Barton v. Myers, 1 Mich. App. 460, 136 N.W.2d 776 (1965)
(conclusive effect).
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ment. If the product was good enough for the United States government, how can they declare it defective? This is especially true
for drugs which the FDA has approved or airframes which the
FAA has certified as "airworthy." If the plaintiff cannot attack
this "goodhousekeeping seal of approval" directly by showing
that the defendant did not disclose all it knew about risks to the
government, then he is remitted to the argument that the common law standard is higher.
The "custom and practice" defense is, upon analysis, the
same issue as that of the governmental approval. It clearly is
relevant, at least in negligence cases, for the jury to know that
other manufacturers were doing the same thing at the same time.
However, there should be no complete defense as a matter of law
accorded to the man who does it the way everyone else does. The
jury should be free to find the whole industry at fault by being
behind the times, an approach sanctioned long ago in the famous
T. J. Hooper decision by Judge Hand. 3 '
29. What are the exceptions to the "repairs doctrine"?
The general rule against admission of otherwise highly relevant proof about modifications of the product after an accident
is logically founded on the theory that potential defendants will
otherwise be discouraged from making repairs.' 3' Nonetheless,
many exceptions have been made to the "repairs doctrine" by the
courts in product cases, each with its own rationale. This issue is
not limited to actual repairs or design modifications but covers
all post-accident events, such as modifications of labeling (as in
drug cases), changes in the terms of a license or approval, recalls,
and even censures and criticisms.
The established exceptions to the "repairs doctrine" in product cases are:
(a) feasibility-what it was that the defendant could have
done before the accident, but carelessly failed to do;' 4'
(b) proof of the very existence of a defect or proof of dangerousness;"'
138. 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
139. See generally 1 FRUMER § 12.04; Note, ProductsLiability and Evidence of Sub.
sequent Repairs, 1972 DUKE L.J. 837.
140. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961); Incollingo v. Ewing,
444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash.2d 833, 454 P.2d 205
(1969); Stark v. Allis-Chalmers & Northwest Roads, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 399, 467 P.2d 854
(1970).
141. Manos v. Trans World Airlines, 324 F.Supp. 470 (E.D. Ill. 1971); Ginnis v.
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Often the defendant may open the door for proof of this sort by
arguing that it complied with the rules or that there was nothing
more it could have done within reason to have prevented the
accident. Where an auto manufacturer recalls a line of vehicles
some time after one of them has been involved in an accident, is
it not relevant proof of the existence of a preventable defect if the
plaintiff can show that the need for recall could have been earlier
determined through the exercise of due care?
Since the rationale of the rule is that the defendant must not
be discouraged from voluntarily correcting defects, it follows that
there is no "repairs doctrine" barrier to proof of subsequent
events which are compulsory, as where the government forces a
change in design or labeling."'
30.

On what matters may the expert witness testify?

There is very little judicial hostility toward the expert in the
product field, because, as in the malpractice area, the trier of the
facts can bring little relevant experience to the evaluation of the
issues. Hence, experts have been allowed to testify on a wide
variety of topics, which may be outlined as follows:
(a) the product was defective, unsafe or the like;'44
(b) the defendant was careless or departed from the standard,
the issue is one of design, testing, construction or labelwhether
5
ing;

4

Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408,470 P.2d 135 (1970). In Gasteigerv. Gillenwater, 57 Tenn.
App. 206, 417 S.W.2d 568 (1966), it was apparently held that a subsequently made repair
was evidence of prior existing fault where the repair was made to bring the object up to a
prior existing standard.
142. Witz v. Cadillac Hotel, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 824, 227 N.E.2d 308, 280 N.Y.S.2d 391
(1967).
143. Carter Carburetor Corp. v. Riley, 186 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1951); cf., Stahlheber
v. American Cyanamid Co., 451 S.W.2d 48 (Mo. 1970).
144. Roberts v. United States, 316 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1963); Passwaters v. General
Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972); Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d
Cir. 1964); Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Corp., 286 F.2d 478 (9th Cir. 1961); Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Gates & Sons, Inc.,
v. Brock, 199 So.2d 291 (Fla.App. 1967); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 42, 290 A.2d
281 (1972) (machine was a "booby trap").
145. McCarthy v. Kroger Co., 385 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920
(1968); Ilnick v. Montgomery Ward Co., 371 F.2d 195 (6th Cir. 1967); Swearngin v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 376 F.2d 637 (10th Cir. 1967); Shabshin v. Pacifico, 196 Cal.App.2d 192,
16 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1961).
146. LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F.Supp. 373 (W.D. Pa. 1967); Reynolds v. Natural
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(c) there was a better or safer way to make the product; "'
(d) causation. "7
Gas Equip., Inc. 184 Cal.App.2d 724, 7 Cal.Rptr. 879 (1960); Moren v. Samuel M. Langston Co., 96 Ill.App.2d 133, 237 N.E.2d 759 (1968); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278
Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co.,
248 Minn. 319 79 N.W.2d 688 (1956); Finnegan v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 60 N.J. 413, 290 A.2d
286 (1972).
147. Pritchard v. Ligget & Myers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965); Taylor
v. Carborundum Co., 107 Ill.App.2d 12, 246 N.E.2d 898 (1969); Patterson v. George H.
Weyer, Inc., 189 Kan. 501, 370 P.2d 116 (1962); Nelson v. Coleman Co., 249 S.C. 652, 155
S.E.2d 917 (1967).
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